قراءة في سيرة الإمام علي (عليه السلام) في الحكم من منظور المستشرقين (دراسة مقارنة بين دونالدسون ولورا فيتشيا فاغليري)

The governing conduct (sirah) of Imam Ali (AS) has attracted the attention of scholars from various intellectual traditions, including Orientalists. Upon assuming the caliphate, Imam Ali (AS) faced numerous challenges, including economic inequality, religious deviations, and social corruption. At the same time, the conflicts with the Nakithun (the Oath-Breakers), Qasitun (the Transgressors), and Mariqun (the Seceders) constituted major obstacles to the implementation of his reform agenda. This study seeks to examine the approaches and assessments of two Orientalist scholars, namely Donaldson and Vaglieri, regarding the governing conduct of Imam Ali (AS).
Employing the historical method, the study argues that both Donaldson and Vaglieri, despite their prominence in Shi‘i studies, approached the subject from a largely unsympathetic perspective, often overlooking the political and social constraints surrounding Imam Ali’s rule and relying heavily on non-Shi‘i historical sources.
Vaglieri argues that Imam Ali’s accession to the caliphate was supported only by a minority of the Muslim community and maintains that his governing policies were heavily influenced by the rebels involved in the opposition to Uthman. Furthermore, contrary to widely accepted historical accounts, she claims that supporters of Imam Ali exerted pressure on those who refused to pledge allegiance and considers attempts to compel political opponents into submission to have been premature and politically unwise. By portraying the opponents of Uthman as merely a minority faction and linking Imam Ali’s election exclusively to their support, Vaglieri implicitly lends credibility to Mu‘awiya’s refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the caliphate and ultimately portrays Imam Ali as ineffective in governing the state. Donaldson sought to portray the succession of Imam Ali (AS) primarily as a hereditary matter. He therefore argued that the only plausible explanation for Ali's selection as successor was the expectation that the Prophet's descendants should inherit his position, since the continuation of the Prophet's lineage through his daughter Fatima (AS) stood in tension with prevailing Arab notions of patrilineal descent. In this way, Donaldson reduced the question of the Imamate and caliphate to a familial and dynastic issue rather than viewing it as a divinely ordained institution grounded in spiritual and moral qualifications. In discussing the events following the Prophet's death and the gathering of the Ansar at Saqifah, followed by the arrival of Abu Bakr, Umar, and Abu Ubaydah al-Jarrah and the subsequent deliberations, Donaldson adopts a skeptical tone toward the position of some supporters of Imam Ali (AS). Referring to the statement reportedly made by certain members of the Ansar that "we shall pledge allegiance to none but Ali," he remarks that it remains unclear why the Ansar abandoned their own candidate, Sa'd b. Ubadah, and instead proposed a compromise in favor of Ali, who belonged to the Quraysh. With regard to the pledge of allegiance to Imam Ali (AS), Donaldson makes little mention of the widespread public demand for his leadership or the large crowds that gathered to offer their allegiance. Rather, he portrays the process as being secured through the support of several influential individuals: al-Ashtar allegedly guaranteed the support of the people of Kufa, Talhah and al-Zubayr assured the backing of the Muhajirun, while Abu al-Haytham, Uqbah, and Abu Ayyub declared the support of the Ansar. At the same time, he emphasizes that three prominent members of the Quraysh—Marwan b. al-Hakam, Sa'id b. al-'As, and al-Walid b. Uqbah—refused to pledge allegiance to the Imam. According to Donaldson, their opposition stemmed from personal grievances, including the fact that Imam Ali (AS) had killed the fathers of two of them at the Battle of Badr and had criticized the policies of Uthman, including his association with al-Hakam b. al-'As, who had previously been exiled by the Prophet. Donaldson further presents these three individuals as representative voices of the Quraysh and concludes that the Quraysh as a whole were dissatisfied with the caliphate of Imam Ali (AS). He likewise notes that Talhah and al-Zubayr later joined this opposition and claimed that their pledge of allegiance had been given under duress, while making no reference to the historical circumstances and political motivations that contributed to their subsequent breach of allegiance.
An examination of the historical sources, however, reveals a picture significantly different from that presented by these Orientalist interpretations concerning both the legitimacy of Imam Ali's caliphate and the circumstances of the pledge of allegiance. Imam Ali (AS) himself vividly described the extraordinary public enthusiasm that accompanied his accession to power, stating that the crowds surged around him "like the thick mane of a hyena," pressing upon him from every direction until Hasan and Husayn (AS) were nearly trampled underfoot and his cloak was torn from both sides, while the people gathered around him like dense flocks of sheep. This depiction is corroborated by numerous historical accounts, while Shi'i sources in particular emphasize the unprecedented scale of public participation and even preserve the names of many of those who pledged allegiance.
Orientalist scholarship has also addressed Imam Ali's administrative policies, especially his dismissal and appointment of provincial governors. Although these changes were largely based upon principles of meritocracy and administrative reform, Vaglieri accuses the Imam of acting under the influence of opponents of Uthman and argues that the removal of certain governors was undertaken in response to their demands. She writes that despite Ibn Abbas advising Ali to proceed cautiously, he immediately implemented measures that had been requested by anti-Uthman groups by dismissing governors appointed by Uthman and replacing them, whenever possible, with members of his own circle.
Even with regard to Mu'awiyah, Imam Ali (AS) refused to engage in political compromise, reportedly declaring that he was unwilling to leave Mu'awiyah in office even for a single moment. Nevertheless, Vaglieri portrays the Imam's policy toward his opponents, particularly Mu'awiyah, as hasty and confrontational. Without reference to the prior correspondence and negotiations that had taken place between the two sides, she writes that Ali hastily assembled an army in order to compel Mu'awiyah's submission, but that another major rebellion forced him to postpone military operations in Syria, whereas Mu'awiyah, for his part, pursued a policy of caution and delay. She subsequently discusses the major conflicts of the Imam's reign and the influential opposition movements that confronted him, ultimately presenting these difficulties as contributing factors to his martyrdom.
The findings indicate that, contrary to the assumptions advanced by these two Orientalist scholars, Imam Ali's accession to the caliphate was met with broad support from the majority of the Muslim community. His model of governance was firmly grounded in the principle of meritocracy, and his approach toward political opponents was characterized by remarkable forbearance and restraint. Despite the numerous challenges and obstacles confronting his administration, the Imam demonstrated prudence, competence, and effective leadership in governing the Islamic polity.